12/27/06 (OH):
Expert's Opinion on Battered Woman Syndrome Allowed
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The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that prosecutors can present evidence of battered woman syndrome when the credibility of a domestic violence victim is challenged.
The court rejected the argument of a man appealing his 2003 conviction on charges of kidnapping his girlfriend and beating her multiple times with a belt. Defendant Bryan Haines said the judge in his trial improperly allowed prosecutors to present an expert witness' testimony about battered woman syndrome.
Justice Paul Pfeifer says evidence establishing the cycles of battering in a relationship is an appropriate basis for such testimony. But Judge Pfeifer says that judges must also balance the use of such testimony since in some cases it can wrongly imply a defendant's guilt.
A summary of the judgement follows:
2005-0853 and 2005-0959. State v. Haines, 2006-Ohio-6711.
Lake App. No. 2003-L-035, 2005-Ohio-1692. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor and O'Donnell, JJ., concur.
Lanzinger, J., dissents.
(Dec. 27, 2006) The Supreme Court of Ohio held today that, when the credibility of an alleged victim of domestic violence has been challenged on cross-examination during the state's case-in-chief, the state may introduce limited expert testimony regarding "battered woman syndrome" to aid the judge or jury in determining the victim's state of mind in returning to or remaining in a relationship with the defendant despite the alleged abuse.
In a 6-1 decision authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, the Court partially affirmed and partially reversed a ruling in which the 11th District Court of Appeals upheld the admissibility of expert witness testimony in the 2002 trial of Bryan Haines of Painesville that resulted in his convictions for kidnapping, abduction and felony domestic violence against his live-in girlfriend, Jacqueline Bohley.
A jury found Haines guilty on all counts for three incidents within an 18-day span in which he was alleged to have physically assaulted, threatened and unlawfully restrained the freedom of Bohley.
At trial, during their cross-examination of Bohley after she had testified about the alleged abuse as a witness for the state, defense attorneys challenged Bohley's credibility based on her continued cohabitation with Haines after the alleged abuse, her failure to report the assaults at the times they allegedly occurred, and statements she made to her doctor and co-workers during the time period in question denying that she had been abused. Over defense objections, the trial court later permitted the Lake County prosecutor to introduce testimony by Dr. James Eisenberg, an expert on "battered woman syndrome." Dr. Eisenberg gave a general description of the syndrome and stated that its victims were sometimes so intimidated by repeated abuse that they failed to take advantage of obvious chances to report or leave their abusers, and sometimes lied to conceal the fact that they were victims of domestic violence. Under further questioning by the prosecutor, Dr. Eisenberg went on to testify that he had reviewed Bohley's statements and behavior in this case, and found them to be consistent with battered woman syndrome.
Haines was sentenced to a total of 15 years in prison. He appealed, asserting among other claims that the trial court erred by admitting Dr. Eisenberg's testimony about battered woman syndrome. Defense attorneys argued that Eisenberg's testimony violated Haines' fair trial rights under Ohio's rules of evidence, including Evidence Rule 403, which bars admission of evidence even though it is relevant to a charged crime if the probative value of that evidence "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" against the defendant.
The 11th District Court of Appeals reversed one of Haines' kidnapping convictions on grounds unrelated to the battered woman testimony, but upheld the admissibility of that testimony and affirmed the rest of the trial court's judgment. In doing so, however, the court of appeals acknowledged that its holding was in conflict with a decision of the 5th District Court of Appeals in a similar 1991 case, State v. Pargeon. The Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments to resolve the conflict between appellate districts.
Writing for the majority in today's decision, Justice Pfeifer acknowledged that testimony describing battered woman syndrome can be prejudicial to defendants charged with violence against domestic partners, but held that trial courts may admit carefully limited testimony about the syndrome to help jurors evaluate defense challenges to the credibility of an alleged victim based on her inconsistent conduct and statements following the claimed incidents of abuse.
"In this case, Bohley's behavior after incidents of alleged abuse was a focus of Haines's cross-examination," Justice Pfeifer wrote. "During cross-examination of Bohley, Haines attempted to demonstrate that Bohley would become intimate with Haines after he allegedly abused her, that she broke off their relationship only temporarily, that she did not report the abuse, and that she gave differing explanations regarding some of her injuries. In short, the testimony tended to show that Bohley not only never reported the abuse but that she remained in the relationship."
Justice Pfeifer agreed with the 11th District's holding that Dr. Eisenberg's battered-woman testimony was relevant to the case, but noted that such testimony inevitably presents a risk of prejudicing jurors. " An expert witness who diagnoses a victim as a battered woman essentially concludes that the defendant is a batterer," he wrote. "In a case where the underlying charges involve domestic violence, such a conclusion by an expert witness is prejudicial to the defendant and usurps the jury's role as finder-of-fact. … In cases where domestic violence is not the underlying charge, but battered-woman-syndrome testimony is offered to explain the conflicting statements or activities of a witness, a defendant can again be prejudiced by being labeled as a batterer. Thus, courts must carefully balance the admission of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome under Evid.R. 403."
In setting an acceptable balance for admission of battered woman testimony, Justice Pfeifer wrote: "The rule in most jurisdictions is that general testimony regarding battered woman syndrome may aid a jury in evaluating evidence, and that if the expert expresses no opinion as to whether the victim suffers from battered woman syndrome or does not opine on which of her conflicting statements is more credible, such testimony does not interfere with or impinge upon the jury's role in determining the credibility of witnesses."
Applying that analysis, the Court held that Dr. Eisenberg's testimony in this case "crossed the line" of being prejudicial to Haines because Eisenberg was asked and answered questions before the jury eliciting his expert opinion that specific facts of Bohley's case were "very consistent with what we see in a Battered Woman Syndrome scenario." Responding to the state's argument that any undue endorsement of Bohley's credibility resulting from this expert testimony should be dismissed as harmless error, Justice Pfeifer noted that several of the counts against Haines depended almost completely on Bohley's unsupported statements, while other counts were supported by the testimony of police and other evidence.
"Counts 1 through 3 relate to the incident on March 31, 2002. The evidence regarding that incident is almost entirely based upon Bohley's testimony, and therefore relies on her credibility. Bohley did not report that incident to the police for weeks. She continued to reside with Haines after it occurred. There is a reasonable probability that evidence concerning her credibility might have contributed to the jury's verdict on those counts... We thus find that the trial court's error in admitting Eisenberg's testimony attributing battered woman syndrome to Bohley was not harmless as to Counts One through Three," wrote Justice Pfeifer.
"The evidence concerning the counts relating to the incident of April 17-18 was more varied. The jury saw photographs of Bohley's injuries, heard testimony from her co-workers regarding her telephone calls to her office on the morning of April 18, and heard testimony from the police officers responding to the scene. Jurors were not confronted with questions about why Bohley had not reported the incident, as they were with the March 31, 2002 incident. Thus, we find Eisenberg's testimony harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on Counts Four through Six; there is not a reasonable possibility that his testimony contributed to those convictions."
Justice Pfeifer's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Alice Robie Resnick, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O'Connor and Terrence O'Donnell.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger entered a dissent in which she pointed out that prior Ohio court decisions and a specific section of state law, R.C. 2901.06(B), permitting expert testimony about battered woman syndrome in criminal cases allow such testimony only on behalf of a defendant who is charged with a violent crime and asserts the affirmative defense that she was acting in self-defense against an alleged abuser. By allowing the state to introduce such potentially prejudicial testimony against a criminal defendant, she wrote, today's majority opinion "transform(s) a shield for the defense into a sword for the prosecution."
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